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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

\
WILLIAM L. BEEZLEY,
R~aintiff aJnAd A pp~ellamt,

-vs.-

Case No. 8287

ELIAS HANSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEF·ENDANT AND· RESPONDENT

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE
The statement made by appellant under the heading
STATEMENT OF F\ACTS is so brief that the Court
will find it difficult, if not impossible, from such statement to ascertain just what is the basis for the trial
court's ruling awarding defendant and respondent a
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
It is, therefore, deemed necessary to state in greater
detail than is contained in appellant's brief, the admitted facts upon which the court below made the order
complained of.
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At the time and times complained of by the plaintiff and appellant, there was pending in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County ·a p-roceeding for divorce
brought by Ella H. Beezley, the daughter of the defendant herein, against William L. Beezley, the plaintiff
herein. It is so alleged in plaintiff's complaint (R. 1
and 2) and admitted in defendant's Answer (R. 3-7).
In that ·divorce proceeding the plaintiff in this action made the defendant herein a third party defendant.
(See Excerpt from Dep·osition of Elias Hansen, certified to by Lois P. Crowder, R. 20-25).
In the above mentioned divorce proceeding the
plaintiff herein filed a Counterclaim in which he sought
to have awarded to him an interest in an apartment
house located at 150 South 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The title to the apartment house stood in the na1nes of
this defendant and his daugh~er, Ella H. Beezley, and
the plaintiff herein was by his Counterclaim attempting
to establish in himself a one-half of the interest which
Ella H. Beezley held in said apartment house. Plaintiff
herein, according to the affidavits of the defendant herein and Ella H. Beezley, which are not denied, sought
to establish his right to such interest in the apartment
house at 150 South 7th East because, as he ·claimed, he
had paid the purchase price of a Harrison Avenue home
and the title thereto taken in his name and the name of
his wife, Ella H. Beezley. It is further made to appear
by the affidavits of the defendant and his daughter,
Ella H. Beezley, that when the plaintiff herein made
the claim that he paid the whole of the purchase price
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of the Harrison Avenue property his wife, Ella H. Beezley, requested the defendant herein to attempt to· find
the checks which he had given her in payment of an
obligation which he, defendant herein, had owed to his
daughter, Ella H. Beezley, and which she claimed she
had paid on the purchase price of the Harrison A venue
property. That in the course of the conversation about
such checks, the defendant herein, in substance, stated
to his daughter, Ella H. Beezley that, "if he (plaintiff
herein) were honest, he would admit that you paid that
money on the property". (R. 23). Apparently the plaintiff herein had acquired information that defendant had
made such a statement to his wife, Ella H. Beezley,
because when the deposition of the defendant herein
was taken the plaintiff herein examined the defendant
with respect thereto. (See excerpt of deposition of Elias
Hansen, certified to by Lois P. Crowder, Notary Public,
R. 21-25). The statement made by the defendant to hi8
daughter above mentioned forms· the basis of one of
plaintiff's claims that he is, by reason thereof, entitled
to damages in the sum of $50,000.00. The other basis
for such claim is the fact that in answer to question8
asked the defendant herein by the plaintiff herein during
the course of taking defendant's deposition, he gave the
answer above quoted.
It is further made to appear by the affidavits of
the defendant herein and Ella H. Beezley that when
she concluded to bring an action for a divorce from her
husband, William L. Beezley, the plaintiff herein, she
sought the advice of the d~_fendant herein; that the de-
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fendant advised her that it would be in1proper for hun
to· represent her in court, but he would advise her with
respect to her action. In one of the pleadings filed by
the plaintiff herein in the divorce proceedings filed by
his wife, he alleges that his wife is the daughter of a
lawyer, who has advised her legally during all of the
times herein mentioned. (R. 37) However, in his reply
filed in this action, plaintiff denies that defendant has
acted in the capacity of attorney for Ella H. Beezley
and that J. Grant Iverson was her attorney.
Interrogatories were served upon the plaintiff herein. Among the questions asked in the Interrogatories
so served and the answers given are the following:
"1. Where in Salt Lake County was the defendant, Elias Hansen, when it is alleged in plaintiff's complaint that on or about July 17, 1953
the defendant stated concerning the plaintiff:
''That guy isn't honest and that if he were honest,
he would admit that she paid that money on the
property."
Answer : Had no occasion to keep track of
defendants' whereabouts and therefore knew nothing as to defendants' location.
2. What are the names of all persons who
were present at the time the defendant is alleged
to have made the statements set out in the foregoing Interrogatory No. 1.
Answer. ·Am unable to state at this time,
but Ella H. Beezley to whom the statement was
published can give you the desired infor1nation."
It will be noted that in the Affidavit of Elias Hansen
(R. 16-19) and in the Affidavit of Ella H. Beezley (R.
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26-27), it is avered that at the time the defendant made
the statement about which plaintiff herein complains,
there was no one present other than the defendant herein and his daughter, Ella H. Beezley.
Upon the record thus made in the Court below, the
judgment on the pleadings was properly granted for the
following reasons :

POINT ONE
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF PRAYED OR TO
ANY RELIEF.

POINT TWO
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA
H. BEEZLEY, RELATIVE TO THE LACK OF HONESTY OF
THE PLAINTIFF WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED, BECAUSE OF THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

POINT THREE
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER,
ELLA H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE
WITH HER TO BE PRODUCED IN HER DIVORCE PROCEEDING WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE
DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS TO BE A WITNESS IN SUCH
PROCEEDING.

POINT FOUR
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA
H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE WITH HER
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TO BE PRO·DUCED IN HER DIVO·R,CE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN WERE ABSOLUTELY
PRIVILEGED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS
A THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT IN SAID.DIVORCE ACTION.

POINT FIVE
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE ANSWERS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT HEREIN TO THE
QUESTIONS ASKED HIM BY THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN
IN TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE DEFENDANT ON
O·R ABOUT JANUARY 9, 1954 WERE ABSO·LUTELY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE SUCH ANSWERS WERE GIVEN IN A
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND PLAINTIFF REQUESTED
SUCH ANSWERS.

POINT SIX
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED.

ARGUMENT
Before taking up a discussion of the foregoing
points, it may be well to direct the attention of the Court
to the distinction made by the authorities between conditional privileged communication and absolute privileged communications:
U.C . A. 1953, 76-40-8 provides:
''A communication made to persons interested
in the communication by one who is also interested or who stands in such relation to the former
as· to afford a reasonable ground for supposing
his motive innocent is not presumed to be malicious and is a privileged communication."
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Among the cases dealing with conditional privileged
communications from this jurisdiction are: Hales v.
Commercial Barnk of Spanish Fork, 114 Utah 186; 197
Pac (2d) 910; Williams v. Standard E;na1niner Pub. Co.
83 Ut. 31, 27 Pac (2d) 1; Spielberg v. A. Kuhn arnd Bros.
39 Utah 276; 116 Pac 1027; Malouf v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. 75 Utah 175, 192, 283 Pac.1065.
It will be noted in the last case just cited the question was raised as to the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a cause of action beeause of its being faulty ~as to
its allegations as to the injury complained of having
been sustained concerning the business of the plaintiff.
The rule is there recognized that in the absence of a
slander per se, it must be made to appear that the communication complained of must be concerning the business of the plaintiff. The rule there recognized and discussed is thus stated in 33 Am. J'ur. 70, Sec. 50, where
it is said:
"Thus· to accuse a person orally of cheating
or of being a cheat, rascal, swindler, blackleg or
the like is not actionable unless special damage
is shown; or the charge is made of a person in
connection with his occupation or with reference to· his method of carrying on business."
· While the question of absolute immunity from liability for spoken words which may be slanderous was
not involved in the case of Williams v. Ogden Standard
Examiner Publ. Co., supra, the court recognized the existence of such doctrine. On page 58 of the Utah report
(83 Utah) it is said that there are t\vo classes of pri-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

v.il~~~d _comrp.unications (1) _absolute p-rivilege. ~d (2)

qualified or conditional privilege. In the case of absolute
p~ivileged communication "the utteranc~ or publication
although both false and m~alicious does not give rise to
a cause of action". The same classification is made by
the authorities generally. In defining. privileged communications, it is said in 33 Am. J ur. page 123, Sec. 125:
"An absolutely privileged communication is
one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion
on which, or the matter in refe-rence to which it
is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action,
however hard it may bear upon a person who
claims to be injured thereby, and even though it
may have been made maliciously. . . . The privilege is not intended so much for the protection
of those engaged in the public service and in the
enactment and administr:ation of law, as for the
promotion of the public welfare, the p·urpose being
that members of the legislature, judges of courts,
JUrors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their
minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a .criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages."
Even if, contrary to our contention, the language
complained of could, under some circumstances, give
rise to an action for shinder, the facts in this case makes
th~ commu~ication here involved absolutely privileged.
POINT ONE
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF PRAYED OR TO
ANY RELIEF.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

In a,ppellant's brief on page 3 thereof under paragraph 2, 3 and 4, it is said that the words spoken to
plaintiff's wife injured ·and damaged plaintiff in his
profession and occupation, destroyed the confidence in
plaintiff, and charged plaintiff with embezzlement and
fraudulently appropriating money entrusted to him.
By no stretch of the language complained of can the
same be said to convey the meaning contended for in the
appellant's brief. It is quite apparent that plaintiff had
lost the confidence of his wife in that she had brought
a suit against him for a divorce. It was the wife of the
plaintiff who charged him with falsely making the claim
that she had not contributed towBtrds the purchase of the
Harrison Ave. property. She it was who sought the aid
of the defendant herein to establish such fact by trying
to find the cancelled checks that she gave to the plain tiff
herein to apply on the purchase price of the Harrison
Ave. property. The language complained of did not
charge the plaintiff with appropriating the money to a
purpose other than that for which it was intended to b·e
used. Quite the contrary, the language complained of
tended to show that the money had actually been used
for the intended purpose, but the plaintiff denied that
it had bee~ so used. Nor did the fact that the plaintiff
denied that his wife had contributed to the purchase of
the Harrison Avenue property even remotely have any
bearing upon the occupation or profession of the plaintiff. If there was anyone who knew or should kno'\\-what was done with the money which the defendant paid
to his daughter, it was she. It is obvious that by the
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defendant saying that if the p·laintiff were honest he
would admit that his wife had paid the money. on the
Harrison Avenue: property did not relate to plaintiff's
manner of doing business. The most that can be said of
such language is that the defendant believed that his
daughter spoke the truth when she said that she applied
the money paid to her by the.defendant on the purchase
price of the p.roperty. It is, of course, elementary that
to recover damages for. slander the words spoken must
have naturally and proximately injured the person con~
cerning which such words were spoken. Kuhne v. Ahlers,
92 N.Y.S. 41. The plaintiff could not have been damaged
merely because the defendant .told his daughter that.she
spoke the -truth.

P,OINT TWO
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATEMENTS·MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA
H. BEEZLEY, RELATIVE, T_O THE LACK OF HO·NESrY.OF
THE PLAINTIFF WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED, BECAUSE OF THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

We have a. statute U.C.A. 1953 7.8-24-8 which pro.vides that:
"There are particular relations in which it is
the policy. of .the law to encourage c'onfidence and
to presume· it inviolate.· Therefore a. person cannot be examined as' a' witness in. the following
cases: * ·* *·~. *· (2) An attorney cannot; without
the consent of. ·his client be examined .as to any
communication. made by the client to him, or .his
advice given therein, in the course of professional
employment."
·
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Apparently in this ease the plaintiff acquired the
inforn1ation from his wife as to the observations made
by the defendant concerning the honesty of the plaintiff.
However, if communications had by an attorney with
his client is to be inviolate as by law provided, it would
seem obvious that the client may not render the attorney
liable in damages by revealing what the attorney has
told the client in the course of his employment. In this
connection it may be observed that the mere fact that
the attorney serves without compensation does not affect the relation of attorney and client. Mark v. Sharp,
138 Mich 448; 101 N.W. 631. Communications had between attorney and client are, by the ~authorities generally, held to be absolutely privileged. The law in such
particular is thus stated in Restatement of the Law of
Torts, Vol 3, Sec. 586, pages 229·-230:
"An attorney at law is absolutely privileged
to publish false and defamatory matter of an.other in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of
or during the course and as part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it
has some relation thereto; (a) The privilege
stated in this section is based upon public policy
of securing to ·attorneys as officers of the court
the utmost freedo1n in their efforts to secure justice for their clients. Therefore, the privilege is
absolute. It protects the attorney from liability
in an action for defan1ation. irrespective of his
purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his
belief in its truth or even his knowledge of its
falsity. These matters are of importance only in
determining the amenability of the attorney to
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the disciplinary power of the court of \vhich he
is an officer. The publication of defamatory matter by an attorney is protected not only when
made in the institution of the proceedings or in
the conduct of litigation before a judicial tribunal,
but in conference and other communications preliminary ther·eto. The institution of a judicial
proceeding includes all pleadings and affidavits
necessary to set the judicial machinery in motion.
The conduct of the litigation includes the examination and cross-examination of witnesses,
comments upon the evidence and argument, both
oral and written, upon the evidence whether made
to court or jury."
Among the numerous adjudicated 'Cases where such
doctrine is applied are the following: Zern v. Cu.llam,
63 N.Y. S. (2d) 439; Rogers v. Thompson;, 88 N.J. Law
639, 99 Atl 389; Lang v. Miller, 70 N.E. 128; Reed v.
Thomas, 99 Cal. App. 719·; 279 Pac. 226. Additional
cases to the same effect are collected in Note 4 of 33
Am. Jur, page 116. The cases so collected contain numerous other cases, some of which hold that a pleading
filed in a cause is absolutely privile_ged. That being so
it necessarily follows th·at evidence given in support of
a pleading is likewise absolutely p:rivileged.
It will be observed that before the defendant interposed as a defense in this action his relationship of attorney and client to his daughter the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant at the times involved in the divorce
proceeding acted as the legal adviser of his daughter.
(R. 37) That after defendant filed his answer in which
he alleged as one of his defenses to plaintiff's complaint
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that the language complained of was absolutely privileged because of the relation of attorney and client existing between defendant herein and his daughter, the plaintiff then in a reply denies that such relation existed between defendant and his daughter. (R. 28) This court
is cornmitted to the view that a party may not be heard
to thus change his position. Tebbs v. Peterson, 247 Pac.
(2d) 897.
POINT THREE
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER,
ELLA H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE
WITH HER TO BE PRODUCED IN HER DIVORCE PROCEEDING WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE
DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS TO BE A WITNESS IN SUCH
PROCEEDING.

It is said in Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3
page 233, Sec. 588 that:
"A witness is absolutely privileged to publish
:false and defamatory matters of another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding in which he is testifying if it has some
relation thereto. * * * It is not necessary that he
give his testimony under oath, it is enough that
he is permitted to testify. It also protects him
while engaged in private conference with an attorney at law with reference to proposed litigation, either civil or criminal."
To the same effect is the law stated in 33 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 146, page 142 and the cases cited in the foot ndte.
If a communication of a prospective witness had
with a party to an action or his attorney 1nay subject the
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party 1naking such communication liable if p·erchancc
such statement turns out to he false, the purpose of the
law providing for absolute privileged communication will
have been violated. An attorney must rely upon his
client for infor1nation as the testimony of the witnesse.-5
who are to be used and unless the attorney is informed
as to what a witness will testify to before he is called
as a witness, the orderly procedure of the trial will be
rendered impossible.

POIN'T F'OUR
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELLA
H. BEEZLEY, IN GOING OVER THE EVIDENCE WITH HER
TO BE PRODUCED IN HER DIVO·RCE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN WERE ABSOLUTELY
PRIVILEGED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HEREIN WAS
A THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT IN SAID DIVORCE ACTION.

Again quoting from Restatement of the Law of
Torts, Vol 3, p;age 231, Sec. 587, it is said:
"A party to a private litigation . . . is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or
in the institution of or during the course and as
a part of a judicial proceeding in which he particip·ates, if the rna tter has some relation thereto.
Comment A. The pTivilege stated in this se'Ction
is based upon the· public interest in according to
all persons the utmost freedom of access to the
courts of justice for the settlement of their private disputes. Like the privilege of an attorney,
it is absolute."
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In this case the defendant and his daughter were
both parties defendant and as such had a common interest in defeating plaintiff's clain1 that he had an interest
in the apartment house, the title to which stood in their
names.
POINT FIVE
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOvV THAT THE ANSWERS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT HEREIN TO THE
QUESTIONS ASKED I-IIM BY THE PLAINTIFF I-IEREIN
IN TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE DEFENDANT ON
OR ABOUT JANUARY ·9, 1954 WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED BECAUSE SUCH ANSWERS WERE GIVEN IN A
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND PLAINTIFF REQUESTED
SUCH ANSWERS.

It will be seen that in taking defendant's deposition
at the request of the plaintiff the following questions
were asked defendant by plaintiff.

''Q. Now, you have talked with Ella about the Harrison Avenue property that we used to own, have you not?
A. I have.

Q. Now in talking to her recently did you
guy isn't honest in referring to me~

s~y

that

A. In substance, yes. (R. 21)

Q. Du you have any proof that Ella gave me that
money~

A. Except her statement.

Q. Where are your cancelled checks~
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A. They are destroyed, as I told you. But I haven't
any doubt.

Q. You are making pretty reckless statements.
A. I am certain as I sit here that that money went
to pay on the Harrison Ave. property.

Q. How much~
A. I don't know how much.

Q. You don't know whether it is a fact, but you disregarded that and you made such malicious statements,
why~

A. I made the statement to her that if you were
honest you would admit that she paid that money on the
property."
S.o far as we are able to ascertain the authorities
are all to the effect that the answers given by the defendant to the foregoing questions are ~absolutely privileged. Again quoting from Vol. 3, Restatement of
the Law of Torts, page 233, Sec. 588, it is said:
"The functions of witnesses is of fundamental
importance in the administration of justice. The
final judgment of the tribunal must be based upon
the facts as shown by their testimony and it is
necess-ary therefore that a full disclosure be not
hampered by fear of private suits for defamation.
The compulsory attendance of all witnesses in
judicial proceedings makes the protection thus
accorded the more n·ecessary. The witness is subject to the control of the trial judge in the exercise of the privilege. For abuse of it, he may be
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subject to criminal prosecution for perjury and
to punishment for contempt."
While the testiinony was not given during the trial
of the cause the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that such testimony may, unde-r some circumstances, be
so used.
So also are the authorities to the effect that one
who makes an inquiry may not he heard to complaint
about the response given. Welcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo
233; 110 Pac. 181; Christopher v. Akins, 214· Mass 332;
101 N.E. 971, see also Restatement of the Law of Torts,
Vol 3, page 220, Sec. 583 where it is said
"Except as stated in Sec. 584, the publication
of false and defamatory matter of another is
absolutely privileged if the other consents thereto."

POINT SIX
THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOW THAT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED.

The settled law in this jurisdiction is that truth
is a defense to matters charged as being defamatory.
Williams v. Standard Examiner Publ. Co. 83 Ut. 31; 27
Pac. (2d) 1; D:erouviarn v. Stokes, 168 Fed (2d) 305. In
this case the plaintiff herein was asked this question
and gave under oath this answer in the Interrogatories
submitted to him pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
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"Q. Is it not true that your wife, Ella H. Beezley
paid or furnished the money to 1nake the down payment
on the home you and she purchased in about 1934 on
Harrison A venue¥
A. She didn't make the down payrnent in its entirety
and to the best of my knowledge the down payment of
$250.00 was split equally between myself •and my wife.
It will be seen from the foregoing answer that if
the plaintiff denied that his wife had made any p·ayment
on the Harrison Avenue property, he was in error in
making such statement.
From what has been said the judgment of the lower
court was right ·and should be affirmed with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT' IVERSON
.Attorney for D-efe:n:dant and
Respon.d.ent.
627 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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